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ABSTRACT
An examination of data on labor input and thequantity of output
reveals that most U.S. thdtr1es have marginal costs far below
their prices. The corilus1on rests on the empirical findir that
cyclical variations In labor Input are small compared to variations
In output. In booms, firms produce sthstantially more output and
sell it for a price that exceeds the costs of the addedinputs. The
paper documents the disparity between price and marginal cost,
where marginal cost is estimated from variations In cost from one
year to the next. it considers a wide variety of explanations of the






Acompetitive firm equates its marginal cost to the market
price of its product. The equality of marginal cost and price is a
fuidamental efficiency condition for the allocation of resources.
When the condition holds, the purchasers of the product equate their
marginal rates of substitution to the corresponding marginal rates of
transformation. By contrast, under monopoly or oligopoly, the
allocation of output will be inefficient because price will exceed
marginal cost.
This paper derives and implements a method for estimating the
ratio of price to marginal cost. The method is different from the
one used in most previous investigations--instead of assuming profit
maximization and estimating the slope of the demand schedule (as In
Rosse (1970)), it looks at actual changes in costs. Further, the
method makes no assunptlons about the cost fcnction it is
completely nonparametric. In its simplest form, it estimates the
ratio of price to marginal cost directly from data on price, output,
and the quantities and prices of Inputs. This form proves an exact
basis for a test of the hypothesis that price equals marginal cost. It
also can provide the basis for estimation in a non-competitive
setting when it is plausible that price is a constant markup over
marginal cost, as it would be for a seller facing a demand schedule
with constant elasticity.
The results of applying the est1rnt1cn method to data for total
1manufacturing and to 11 two-digIt industries give a strong
conclusion: Price far exceeds marginal cost for manufacturing as a
whole and for most two-digit industries. For total manufacturing1
the gap between price and marginal cost Is about 63 percent of
marginal labor cost. In some two-digit industries, such as paper and
food and beverages, the gap Is more than double marginal labor cost.
The hypothesis that marginal cost is equated to price is strongly
rejected for total manufacturing and for 16 out of the 21 two-dIgit
Industries.
The paper gives sthstantial attention to possible specification and
data problems that might explain the findings without invoking a
failure of the equality of marginal cost and price. First, it shows
that the estimation method Is robust to cyclical errors in measuring
wages. As long as the average wage icr, more precisely1 the average
factor share of labor Is correctly measured in the long rir,
systematic measurement errors are essentially harmless. if labor
contracts call for wage-smoothing4 for example, the estimation
method still works. Similarly, if the effective marginal cost of
labor varies relative to the wage because of adjustment costs, the
method also still works. A related argument shows that the method
is essentially immune to biases from price rigidity.
Biases arising from measurement errors in output can be avoided
by the use of an appropriate Instrumental variable. For cyclically-
sensitive Industries, total real ON? works well. In industries where
the bulk of output variation is idiosricratic, it is not possible to find
a good instrument.
Biases arising from measurement errors In labor input are moreof a problem. The most plausible source of such errors Is
unmeasred fluctuations In effort per hour of work. The estimation
method is compromised only if the short-run elasticity of the sp1y
of work effort is a significant fraction of the short-run elasticity for
A related explanation of pro-cyclical productivity variationsrelies
on labor aggregation. Scçpose that a given capital stock equips a
number of workers during the daytime shift, and the same capital
equips a smaller number of workers paid a higher wage during the
night shift. if employment during the night shift is the principal
method used to vary the level of output, then productivity
calculations will show a spurious procyclical element if the hours of
both types of workers are added together. Night workers have a
higher marginal product than do day workers. However, the
numerical magnitude of this bias is far too small to account for the
findings of the paper. Another potential explanation for the finding
of marginal cost below price is increasing returns to scale. In a
sense, this explanation is complementary to the basic conclusion of
the paper, since a firm with increasing returns that equated Its
marginal cost to price would operate at a loss. Increasing returns
virtually requires a market structure such that marginal cost falls
short of price. In any case, a modification of the basic equation of
the paper shows that Increasing returns Is only strongly evident In a
few Industries, such as electricity generation. In most industries,
constant returns Is s&çportad by the data.1. Themethod
Consider a firm that produces output Qwithcapital K and
labor N. Assume constant retLrns to scale in K and N. Then the
production function can be written in Intensive form as:
(11 (/C(= eOtf(N/K)
The Intensive production functions ft ) Is concave; 0Isthe rate of
Hicks-neutral technical progress or rate of growth of total factor
productivity. Let q be the leg of the output/capital ratio or capacity
utilization rate tq =1og(Q/K)and let n be the log of the labor!
capital ratio (n =log(N/K)).Taking the time derivative and
approximating with discrete char'es gives
tf4/fQ tI.2) 4n




The hypothesis that price is a constant ratio to marginal cost
can be expressed as
4(1.4) p=e tN/K)
The parametrization of the ratio as 1,/U-fl) is chosen for
convenience. If fiis0.51 for example, price Is double marginal cost.
PuttIng the hypothesIs that prIce Is proportional to margInal cost Into
the expression for the rate of growth of output gives
q— n
The fraction wN/pQ is just labor's share In total revenue; I will
call It a. Making this substitution and multiplying the equation by
1-fl gives
(1.6)
I have added a random disturbance, u, to take account of the facts that
price Is not literally proportional to marginal cost and technology
does not always advance at exactly the same rate, &
Equation 1.6 is the basic Idea of the paper. It can be explained
In the following way. When price equals marginal cost, the revenue
share of labor, a, measures the elasticity of output with respect to
labor, independent of the form of the technology. Subtracting a
times the log change In labor input from the observed log change in
output would yield just the rate of technical progress, under
5marginal cost pricing. However, if the revenue share of labor
understates the elasticity of output with respect to labor, because
price exceeds marginal cost, then the left—hand side will contain a
component related to the change in output. In fact, the coefficient of
the log-change in output Is precisely the parameter, ?, that controls
the departure of price from marginal cost. The observation that,
when price and marginal cost are eqtl, the left-hand side of equation
1.6 measures the growth of producltMy was first made in a famous
paper by Robert Solow (1957). However, the applicaton of the
formula when price Is different from marginal cost is new, so far
as I know.
Solow's method, when applied to intensive data, does not rest on
any assumption that the firm Is using its equilibrium amount of
capital. Rather, it only uses an estimate of the elasticity of output
with respect to labor input, a, and that estimate can be made
accurately from labor's share of revenue, provided only that the firm
is equating the marginal product of labor to the product wage. There
is no Implicit assumption that the marginal product of capital Is
being equated to the real rental price of capital. Similarly, the
tecfrilque proposed here requires only that the firm sets marginal
cost to a proportion of price, given whatever Is its capital stock, and
makes no assumption about how the firm chooses its capital stock.
Estimation of the basic equation will require the hypothesis that
the disturbance, U,isu'correlated with changes in output, or, In the
case of instrumental variable estimation, that u is uicorrelated with
the instrument. Since output is a highly cyclical variable, and the
instrument to be used Is a cyclical aggregate demand variable, a
6vigorous defense of this hypothesis is required. Thetis, my method
depends criticallyon the hypothesis that there is no true cyclical
variation in the Hicks-neutral rate of productivity growth. There is
no denying that producluvity is pro-cyclical in the sense that output
per employee-hour is high when output is high. Nor4 for that matter,
is it in dispute that the year-by-year rate of total factor produciuvty
growth calculated by Solow's method Is equally cyclically variable4
However, both of these well-known propositions are perfectly
consistent with the basic hypotheses I wish to maintain. It Is
eminently likely that firms hoard labor during contractions, which Is
the usual explanation for cyclical variations In outputper
employee-hcxr. However, labor hoarding should not cause cyclical
fluctuations In total factor productivity one of the many virtues of
Solow's tectinlque is Its robustness In the presence of labor hoarding.
Consider a cyclical contraction where output fails substantially
but labor falls by much less because of hoarding. In such a
contaction, marginal cost falls to a low level. The cost of
Incremental output is low because it can be produced simply by
putting hoarded workers back to work, with little Increase In payroll
costs. If price equals marginal cost, the revenue share of labor
rises dramatically because the price falls to the low level of
marginal cost. Consequently, no special cyclical effect appears in
equation 1.6 because the rise in a offsets the low value of n. Of
course, the revenue share of labor does not rise very mc±, if at all,
In contractions, so the Solow calculation gives a substantial decline
in productivity In each contraction. But my point Is that the reason
for this finding Is the failure of marginal cost pricing. The
7pervasive belier in cyclical fluctuations In productivity is really a
pervasive belief that price does not track marginal cost. My
equation .6 is the most plausible explanation for cyclical
fluctuations In productivity, In this interpretation.
I would also offer the positive argument in favor of my basic
Identifying hypothesis that the process of technical change should
logically proceed fairly smoothly. The Index of productivity Is a
feature of the production function. Contractions are not. periods
when firms forget their best produtlon techniques and retreat to less
efficient ones. Rather, the process of creating and installing new
techniques should proceed at very much the same pace throch
cyclical expansions and contractions.
Under the basic Identifying hypothesis that true shifts In
productivity areunrelatedto cyclical fluctuations In real ON?,
estimation of the degree of departure from marginal cost pricing is
a simple matter of comparing the cyclical behavior of the Solow
residual, q -cn,to the behavior of the rate of growth of output.
To the extent that periods of rising output are ones when the actual
growth of output exceeds the amout expected from observations on
the revenue share, a, applied to labor growth, n, price is shown to
exceed marginal cost.
2. Vafue added
Inaddition to the labor and capital considered in the previous
section, firms use materials and other intermediate products as
Binputs to produt1on. Were time series data on other Inputs
available, it would be a simple matter to add additional terms to
equation 1.6, each 000tainnig a factor share multiplying a rate of
growth of an input. However, full input-output data are not available
on an annual basis for U.S Industries. Rather, research of this type
must make use of annual data on nominal and real value added. This
section modifies the earlier analysis to deal with that problem.
In this section, variables with *s signify measures of the
theoretical ideal: 0* is true gross output, q* is the log of the ratio
of Q* to capital, p* Is the actual price of output, u* are the
factor shares of materials and labor relative to the value of gross
output, p*Q*, 0*Isthe rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress in
the production function relating gross output to all inputs, and / is
the parameter governing the ratio of the actual price to marginal
cost. Also, z is the price of materials1 M Is the quantity of
materials employed and m Is the log of the materials-capital ratio.
Then a simple extension of equation 16 showe how $* could be
measured In this setup:
(2.1) Aq* -a*At'i-Am=0* (1S*) +
However,the output measure that is available is not 0*, gross
output, but Is 0, real value added. The rate of growth of the ratio of
real value added to the capital stock is







This relation can be used to eliminate the unobserved q* from
equation 2.1:
i12.3)q -an=(1ft*)+ +
Herea Is the labors share In value added andIs the rate of
technical progress stated In labor-capital augmenting form tO =
O*/t1_u*)).Equation 2.3 says the following: if the growth of the
materials-capital ratio, m, Is uncorrelated with the growth of the
output-capital ratio, q, then the regression of the Solow residual
on the rate of growth of the output-capital ratio, q, will reveal the
price—marginal cost parameter, t?*. However, to the extent that m
Is positively correlated with iq (the likely case), then the
regression coefficient will overstate $*.Inparticular, in the case
where the ratio of materials to output is technologically
fixed, then m =q1and equation 2.3 becomes
(2.4) q-an=0(1-+
1 C,where fi= - In this case, the estimated coefficient, fib,
hasthe interpretation of the ratio of the gap between price and
marginal cost to value added per unit of output. 9 exceeds *bya
factor related to the importance of materials Inputs. Given an
estimate of 8,thecorresponding estimate of the ratio of price to
marginal cost can be recovered by multiplying by I minus the factor
share of materials.
Estimates of are interesting in their ov right, without
adjustment for the share of materials. In the first place, they
measure the price distortion relative to value added. Second, they
provide the best guide to the overall degree of excess of price over
marginal cost for the economy as a whole. Sr..çpose every industry
had the same fiandthe same u*. Then the ratio of the price of a
particular final good to the total marginal cost of production,
counting all stages, would be fi.The1* for any given Industry would
understate the distortion of any given price because it would not count
the distortion built Into materials prices.
The discussion in this section made the implicit assumption that
the charge In real value added was computed eachyear using the
previous year's prices as the base prices (see equation 2.2). In
effect, it assumed the use of a Divisia index of real value added. In
the U.S. national income accounts, base prices are changed about
onceadecade. Jknowofnoreasontothinkthatthelowrrequencyor
base changes has any important influence on the results obtained by
the technique in this paper.
113. Data
Ihave obtained results for total manufacturlr and for 21
two-digit Industries. The data are:
Q: Real value added, U.S. NIPA
K: Net real capital stock, BEA.
p: Implicit deflator with Indirect business taxes removed
(Ratio of nominal value added less 181 to real value
added)
N: Hours of work of all employees, U.S.NIPA
w:Total compersatlon divided by N
Note that the data are chosen to eliminate tax wedges as a source of
departures of marginal cost from price. The price level Is
measured net of sales and other taxes, and the wage Is measured
gross of social security, fringes, and other costs incurred by the
employer.
The NIPA do not report hours of all employees by industry after
1978 or before 1948. Hence, the period stxliad is 1949 throh
1978. In addition, certain industries inderwent definitional changes
In 1973. For those industries, I omitted the 1972-73 change from
the estimation process. The industries are: Lumber (SIC 24),
Furniture (25), Diemicais (28), Rthber (30), PrImary Metals (33),




Table I shows the construt1on of the dependent variable and
Figure 1 shows a scatter diagram of the Solow residual against the
change in output. A strong positive relation is immediately
apparent. There Is no m1stakir the fact that output grows by more
than can be explained by applying the productwage as an estimate of
the marginal product of labor to the observed growth In labor.
Ckitput consistently grows by more In expansions and falls by more In
contractions. The most obvio explanation is that the productwage
understates the marginal product of labor; that is, price exceeds
marginal cost.
The slope of the relation between the Solow residual and the rate
of growth of output Is fi,theparameter that governs the relation
between price and marginal cost. Because the right-hand variable
also appears in the construction of the left-hand variable, it Is
essential to use an estimation method that is Immune to
measrrement errors In output. Regression estimates of $wouldbe
biased upward by purely random errors In the growth of output. My
estimates are based on an lnstri.jniental variables procedure, with
the rate of growth of real GNP as the Instrument.
13Table lData +or totalmanu+acturinq
(percent change or percent)
YearOutput Hours Labor Salow
growthgrowth shareresidual
1949 —7.4 —9.2 71.5 —0.9
1950 10.8 8.1 69.8 5.1
1951 5.8 7.9 9.70I
1952 —1.7 1.9 72.7 —3.1
1953 2.5 4.4 74.0 —0.7
1954 —10.9 —8.7 74.4 —4.4
1955 7.1 5.5 71.8 3.1
1956 —5.1 1.5 73.9 —6.2
1957 —4.7 —1.7 746 —3.4
1958 —10.2 —9.2 76.1 —32
1959 10.4 6.8 73.5 5.6
1960 —2.1 —0.4 754 —1.8
1961 —1.9 —2.8 75.3 0.1
1962 58 4.4 74.4 2.5
1963 5.2 0.9 73.1 4.5
1964 2.7 2.1 72.7 12
1965 1.7 5.2 70.8 —2.0
1966 —1.5 6.7 71.5 —8.3
1967 -7.1 —03 73.0 —6.9
1968 .0 1.3 732 —0.9
1969 -1.9 1.6 75.4 —3.1
1970 —9.8 —.8 77.9 —4.8
1971 —0.1 —4.2 75.6 3.1
1972 4.5 4.1 75.1 34
1973 7.6 5.5 76.0 3.5
1974 —8.9 —1.3 78.8 -7.9
1975 —10.1 —10.9 75.5 —1.9
1976 6.4 4.6 74.3 3.0
1977 2.8 3.9 73.8 —0.1













-15 Rate of growth of output 15
(percent)
15For the 'ole period, 1949 through 1978, the estimated slope is
(4.1)q-cn .0071+.385q
i.070
Standarderror: 2.2% DurbinWatsonstatistic: 1.40
The hypothesis that price and marginal cost are equal ($0) is
overwhelmingly rejected. The implied ratio of the deflator to
marginal labor cost, 1/(1-t?), Is 1.63. The gap between price and
marginal cost is 63 percent of value added.Forthe manufacturing
industry as a unit, value added Is 56.9 percent of sales, netting out
sales within manufacturing. Thus ,S Is no less than 0.385 x .569
=.219and price is at least 1 / (1 -.219) =1.28tImes total
marginal cost. However, this calculation understates the total price
distortion for manufactured goods because itomitsdistortions In the
prices paid for materials and produced Inputs and because It assumes
that the charge In materials Input Is perfectly correlated with the
change In output..
Twü-d!gU !nckistres
Resultsfor selected two-digit Industries are presented In Table 2.
làTable 2. Estimates for twa—digit industries., 1949—78
SIC
code




Notes: The slope is the coefficient of the rate a-fchange of
output. The dependent variable is the Solow productivity
residual. OLS estimates ar-pgivenin those cases where the
standard error of the estimated slope is greater than 0.150..

























26 Paper 0.661 1.51 1.36 48.4
(.044)















32 Stone clay,0.536 1.49 2.02 51.6
and glass (.048)
33 Primary 0.512 1.91 2.36 43.9
metals (033)
34 Fabricated 0.291 2.40 1.43 45.4
metals (.066)
35 Machinery 0.273 2.14 2.23 50.9
(non—elec.) (.056)













49 Elec.. gas, 0.874 1.01 0.480.965 50.3
and sanitary (.319) (.066)In all Industries save texules, tobacco, apparel, lumber, and
printing and publishing, the hypothesis of price equal to margInal
cost is soundlyrejected. Ineight of the 21,exceeds(Lb, wh1c
meansthat the price distortion exceeds marginal laborcostitself,
In most of the industries where Imprecise values ofare found,
the problem appears to be that real GNP is a poor Instrument; most
demand shifts are idiosyncratic to the industry and are not
correlated with overall economIc activity. It is interesting to look
at ordinary least squares results for these Industries, even though
they may be biased because of errors In measuring output. The OLS
results are given on the right of Table 2. In all five of the industries
where the hypothesis of equality of marginal cost and price could not
be rejected on the basis of the instrumental estimates, the hypothesis
is rejected on the strength of the C)LS results. Moreover, in all but
one industry apparel, the C)LS estimate of $exceeds0.5.
185. Analysis o( specification errors
Anumberof explanations of cyclical fluctuations in productivity
come to mind that would represent specification errors in terms of
the theory used In this work. First, employersmay pay their
workers under a wage-smoothing arrangement. Under such an
arrangement, the wage equals the long-run opportunity cost of time,
but does not track short-Ill) fluctuations in labor-market conditions.
Second, employers may Incur adjustment costs, In 'kiih case the
wage does not measure all components of marginal cost related to
labor. Third, prices may not be fully flexible, even thoh they do
not differ from marginal cost on the average. Fourth, labor input
may be measured incorrectly. Fifth, hours of work may not be
aggregated correctly. Sixth, the tecenology may have increasing
rettxns to scale.
The first part of this section develops an argument that none of
the first three specification errors could explain the basic finding of
the paper. The first two errors make the measuredwage differ
from the true effective wage over the cycle, but not in the long run,
Such errors bias the estimate of only in a certain second-order
way, and, In any case, the bias is downward. Neither could explain
the finding of strongly positive values of fi. Similarly, price
rigidity creates only a tiny bias in the estimate and could not explain
a strong positive /i.
The general intuition behind this conclusion can be explained
easily. Consider a situation where marginal cost is equated to price
and all the other assumptions necessary to justify the method of the
19paper hold. Then
(5.1)rq-crn=O
and the regression of r on q will yield a coefficient of zero. Now
suppose that an erroneoc measure, a,Isused In place of
a in the computation of the residual. It may differ from a because
of wage smoothing, adjustment costs, price rigidity, or any other




l'hen the regression of r on q will yield the coefficient,
Cov(-(&-0)4q)
(5.3) = (1
Thecovarlance In the numerator has two terms. The first,
(5.4) Cov(q,q)
will be zero if (a-a)/xandzq both have mean zero and (a-a)/a and
(q)2 are uncorrelated. The lack of correlation Is likely to hold
under rather general conditions. Uthiasedness of a, in the sense of
zero mean of (a-a)/a,Isthe substantive requirement.
The second term in the covariance
205.5) -6Cov(Aq)
is uullkely to be zero, assurnirthatthe measurement error, a-a,
tracks movements in output. However, the term is likely to be
small because it is multiplied by the rate of productivzty growth, &
Moreover, if the covarlance of the departure of the share.
(cr-a)/a, with the growth of output, oq, Is positive, then the bias will
be downward. In other words, if the share tends to be iixferstated
when output is growir, then will be biased downward4
I summarize these conclusions in a
Theorem
If
(1) The true residual, q -an,is equal to the constant rate of
productivity growth, 0, and
(Ii) The measured share, a,ist..rtlased In the sense that
E[(a-cr)/a) =0,and
(iii) q obeys a stationary stochastic process with constant mean and a
symmetric distribution about the mean, and
1v) (a-a)/a depends linearly on past, present, and future values of
then the regression coefficient for the measured residual on the rate




The proof Is sketched above. Note that symmetry of the
distribution of q about Its mean Is sufficient to eliminate the
covariance of ta-al/a and (q)2, since this covarlance will depend
only on third moments of the distribution of q, which are zero by
virtue of symmetry.
The errors arising from the first two sources considered here
arise from the wage. When the other components of the share (price,
quantity, and employment) are measured accurately, then the
proportional error In the share is equal to the proportional error in
the wage. If w Is the true wage (in the sense of the effective
marginal cost of labor) and w is an erroenous measure of It, then
A A
(57)a w
SImilary, when only the price is measured with error, the
proportional error in the share Is the proportional error In the price,
with Its sign reversed.
Wagesmoothing
MartinNeil Bai1ys (1974) pIoneering paper pointed out the
advantage to workers of earning smoothed wages. When workers
22cannot use credit markets as easily as employers can, then it makes
sense to decole earnings from labor-market fluctuations. In the
9xtreme version, workers receive a predetermined real annual
income, unrelated to the amount of work they do and unrelated to the
value of their time. Though such an arrangement could be examined
with the aid of the theorem, I have taken a less extreme view.
Siçpose that workers receive a guaranteed hourly wage, but the wage
Is paid only for hours actually worked. Those hours are determined
not by equating the value of the marginal product of labor to the
wage, but rather by equating the value of the marginal product to the
marginal value of time. The error in measuring the share arises
because the effective wage is the value of time, but the measured
wage is the predetermined contract wage.
&çpose that the wage error can be written as
(5.8)
where 6 is the reciprocal of the elasticity of labor sLpply; that Is,
the elasticity of the marginal value of time with respect to the
amount of work. The elasticity 6 Is a short-run concept, so it is
reasonable to assume that the sthstltuuon effect dominates the
income effect and 6 is not too large. The percent error in the
measured share Is the same, and can be written in terms of output:
(5.9) =6(n-= -
Applicationof the theorem will make use of
2310) Cov[qg)I
V(q)2
whithis true for any stationary times series. Then the theorem
Implies that the coefficient of the regression of the Solow residual
on the rate of thare of the output-capital ratio Is:
A *1
Thefirst thing to say Is thet this Is a small number, compared to the
estimates of fi presented earlier In this paper. If 6 Is I, 0 Is .03,
and a Is 0.7, then 9 is -0.02.Second, fiisnegative. The bias from
wage-smoothing is small and negative; It can form no part of the
explaruon of the finding of positive values of aroud 0.5.
Let me stress again the basic reason for this finding. As lore as
the Solow residual is computed with an biosed estimate of a,the
bias In Is necessarily small. To get a substantial positive value
of it?, it would be necessary to use an estimate of athatwas
systematically too small. Marginal cost chronically below price Is
the most obvious source of a downward blas In a.
Costlyadjustmor
A second potential source of depart of the effective marginal
cost of labor from the quoted wage could arise from adjustment costs
24for labor. Mar{ Bile (1985) has investigated theways that
adjustment costs affect marginal cost.
In a simple set where costs of adjustment are quadratic In the
proportional change in effective labor Input, the marginal cost of
adding an hour of labor Input In year t is:
(5.12) w =w(1 + -
Herew is the measured hourly wage and n Is effective labor input,
that Is, the log of hours of wric measured In efficiency uits:
(5.13) flt
The parameter y has the following interpretation: Ify Is 1, at a
time when employment has risen by 10 percent, the marginal
adjustment cost of labor Is 1/10 of the direct wage cost.
From the adjustment cost modal, it iseasy to derive that:
(5.14) (&
The crucial covariance for the application of the theorem is
(5.15) Aq) =(1 -p)V(q)
wherep Is the serial correlation of q. Then the theorem says that
the coefficient for the regression of the Solow residual on the rate of
change of output is:
25(5.16) $=-11-p)
Again,the coefficient is small and negative. If 0is0.03, y is 2,p
is -.3, and a Is 0.7, then $is-0.11.
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measuredshare of labor to depart from the true share (computed
shadow cost of hours of work) in the long run. Hence the bias from
the error in measuring the share is small.
h-ice rigidity
Agooddeal of thought and evidence points in the direction of price
rigidity. Product prices fluctuate less as demand changes than Is
predicted by the competitive model. Will the method of this paper suffer
from an Important bias if the price Is rigid? The answer is no. If price
rigidity Is itself unbiased—if the price spends as much time below
marginal cost as above marginal cost—then the method will yield an
estimate of fithatis essentially zero. Consider first the relation
between price and output predicted by the competitive model, which can
be approximated closely as
(5.17) p=cr4weOt[1+.t(q-
26Here Is a corstant that depends on the steady-state output-capital
ratio1 which depends in turn on the rental price of capital. Because the
equation makes price conditional on the capital stock, the rental price
doesnotappearexplicitly. A reasonablecharacterization of an unbiased
but rigid price simply drops the q -t termfrom equation 5.17:
(5.18) paweOt
Because many products have product wages (ratios of thewage to the
Implicit deflator for the product) that follow smooth trends, this type of
°prlce equatiod' does well in explaining the data. Theories of price
rigidity generally assume that the firm is a quantity-taker and is
typically off Its short-ri st.ply schedule. For a given level of output, p
from equatIon 5.17 is the proper price to use In productivity
calculations, whereas p from equation 5.18 is what is actaully used.
The error in the share is
(5.19)
Because the share is right on the average, the Theorem applies, and the
estimated ve.Iue of is
(5.20)
ouah positive, this number Is Invariably small. For examples if a
1sO.7and$is0.02,thenisonly0.Oo4. Onceagain, a
specification error that does not bias the labor share has almost no
27impact on the estimate of fi. The finding of strong positive values of
mt come from other sources.
froblems in measrtng labor input
I turn now to specification and data errors that influence labor input,
n, rather than the labor share, c. In the first place, purely random
errors in IAn, u-correlated with the right—hand variable q, do not bias
the estimate of fi.However,the hypotheses that spring to mind about
errors in An suggest they would be negatively correlated with q.
S.ppose, for example, that some workers always report 40 hours of work
per week even though they work more hours when demand is strong and
fewer when it is weak. Then the correlation is clearly negative. Such a
negative correlation could explain the finding of positive ,sincea
negative correlation between q and errors in n brings positive
correlation between q and the measured left-hand variable. In formal
terms, if An Is an erroneoc measure of n, such that a fraction ipof
movements In n are omitted from n, then the Solow residual becomes
t5.21) - = 11-ip)0+
Plainly1the estimate of fiisjuet p. A perfectly competitive induetry
would be diagnosed as having price in excess of marginal cost, when in
fact the problem was the ulerstatament of fluctuations in labor Input.
The likely source of errors in measuring total employee-hours is
presumably In hours per worker, rather than in the cou-t of workers.
28However, char'es in the number of workers accont for a significant
proportion oftotalvariations In employee-hours.Itturns out that the
rnagnltuie of the fluctuations Inactualhours necessary toexplainthe
finding of large fiIslrnplatibly high. FIgure 2 1lhztrates the point
for total manufacturing. The solid line showe the modest fluctuations In
weekly hours per worker as measured in the NIPA. The broken iine
shows the fi'e fluctuations In hours needed to rationalize the finding of
1?0.38.
Amorestle problem of measurement of labor input would arise if
labor had two dimensions, hours and effort. &ppose, for concreteness,
that hours, h, and effort, f, multiply to form labor input, n. if
fluctuations In effort are ignored In computing n, then the situation will
be the same as just described for errors In measurir hours. Figure 3 is
similar to FIgure 2 In computing the magri1ttxe of the fluctuations In work
effort needed to explain the measured fluctuations of productivity in a
competitive setting. Note In particular that effort was more than 10
percent above normal for three successive years In the rnld-1960s.
The variable f can be Interpreted as accomplishmentsper hour then
the assumption that output depends on n says that the uIt of labor input is
the accomplishment. Under these conditions together with competition,
workers would be paid a piecerate per accomplishment equal to the
marginal value of an accomplishment. One of the ways of appraising the
competitive explanation of the finding of positive vlaues of by way of
irobserved variations In work effort Is to ask about Its implications for
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explain uctuati onslabor supply. With the piecework techoology, firms are indifferent
between various combinations of hours and effort that yield the same
volume of accomplishments. The split between hours and effort is based
purely on the preferences of workers.
In this setting, the parameter is interpreted as the ratio of the
elasticity of the supply of effort with respect to the piecerate wage to the
elasticityofthe supply of hours with respect to that wage. A of 0.5,
for example, means that a decline in the plecerate brings equal percentage
declines In effort and hours. in effect, workers with those preferences
respond to lower plecerates by working less intensively. They could
reduce their hours twice as much by continuing the same level of effort1
but choose more leisure on the job and less Ieistre off the job.
FIgure 4 shows that any competitive explanation of the finding of
positivebased on errors in measuring hours or effort must rely heavily
on the theory of wage smoothing. It shows the actual hourly wageandthe
hourly wage computed as the ratio of compensation to the adjusted
measure of labor Irput underlying Figures 2 and 3. The inferred wage is
hourly compensation per actual hour or per accomplishment. In the
expansion of the mld-1960s, the inferred wage actually declined; In the
highly inflationary expansion of the early I 970s, it remained level. It Is
highly u-illkely that the market-clearing wage moved along the Inferred
path. Rather, the competitive explanation must assert that compensation
Is decoupled from hours of' work or work effort. The bulges of extra,
unmeasured hours in FIgure 2 or the bulges of intense effort in Figure 3
were not paid for on a current basis by employers. Instead, workers
provided the extra labor input In accord with of long-term agreements, if
the competitive story Is to be believed.
32Interred it true productivity
growth was constant
19?
Figure 4 Actual and interred hourly wages











One of the few attempts to explain the phenomenon of pro-cyclical
productivity In terms of competitive theory was introduced by Robert
Lucas (i970) and pursued by Thomas Sargent and Nell Wallace (1974). In
essence, they argue as follows: The lerth of the work day Is determined
by economic considerations. Hours of work are more expensive at night1
but a night shift adds to the working hours of capital. Moreover, as
demand fluctuates, much of the adjustment in output may occur In the
form of variations in the use of night shifts. Because an hour of work at
night is more expensive, the nighttime labor/capital ratio is lower and the
marginal product of labor Is higher. Hence, a productivity calculation that
uses the average productivity of labor to adjust for variations in labor
Irçxit will understate the actual marginal product and will create the
erroneous impression of procycllcal productivity.
Let d be the labor/capital ratio for the day shift and
ng
be the ratio
for the night or graveyard shift. Then, under constant returns and a





where ad and a are the elasticities with respect to the two types of
labor thesecod be measuredas factor shares under competition.
S..çpose that the Solow residual Is computed In terms of aggregate hour's:
(5.23) -d+
ag)n
34Two featuresof the night shift relative to the day shift determine the bias
Inmneasuing fi:
X: The excessseriuv1tyof night work relativetodayworkas output
Varies (Aflg =
6:Thegedifferentialfor night work(wd (ló)Wg
Using equatIon 522 to eliminatenfrom equation5.23,and substituting




biasfrom this source Is trivial.
increasing rotzrns toscale




3515.26)q =0÷ aM+ (a +y-lj k
where y Is the elasticity of output withrespectto capital and k Is the
percent increase in K. Under constant returns, when a +y=1,this
expression boils don to Solow1s equation. Now if an erroneously low
estimate of cc is used, a =(1-)a,say because it is rneastred from the
labor share in the presence of marginal cost below price, then the Solow
residual becomes:
(5.27) r -crn=(1-)O+q+(1-$)ta+-
A testof the Inclusion of k in the equation can distinguish constant from
Increasing returns to scale, Independent of the technology. Furthermore,
in the presence of increasing returns, the coefficient of k will serve as
an estimate of 1 - times the degree of Increasing returns. If the
tecf'rology is Cobb-Douglas, the coefficient will have exactly this
interpr9tation if factor shares are reasonably constant over time, the
coefficient will serve as a good average measure.
Adding the rate of growth of capital to the equations estimated in Table
2 produced the following results: The standard errors of the estimates of
(i-)(a+y-1) were generally In the range of 0.1. to 0.2. In 17 out of the
21 two-digit Industries, the hypothesis of constant returns was accepted at
the 95 peroent level. Electric-gas-sanitary (SIC 49) and leather (SIC 31)
had significantly increasing returns, with coefficients of 0.377 and 0.328
respectively. Non-electrical machinery (SIC 35) and communications
36(SIC 48) had significant decreasing returns. Even in those irktries
with evidence of Increasing returns, the estimates of ftitselfwere
scarcely affected by adding k to the equations.
I conclude that there Is little reason to believe that increasing returns
to scale explain the findings of strongly positive values of ft.Evenif one
of the equations had a value of ftofclose to zero together with strong
increasing returns, the findings would be paradoxical, for they would imply
that the firm or Industry was operating at a loss. No sensible model of a
private industry could explain that combination of findings.
6.!rterreiatonand ccnclusUns
The basic fact found In this paper Is neither new nor surprising.
When output rises, firms sell the output for considerably more than
they pay for the incremental inputs. Most economists have been
content to invoke the idea of cyclical fkctuauons in productivity in
thinking about this fact. My point In this paper is that the fact
almost certainly Involves a dramatic failure of the principle that
marginal cost is equated to price. Marginal cost is literally the
increase in the cost of inputs needed to produce added output. That
increase is small, so marginal cost Is small. When it is compared
to price, a large gap is found In most industries. The most obvious
explanation of the finding of price far in excess of marginal cost is
37monopoly power in the product market. For a straightforward profit
maximizing monopoly1 the parameter *couldbe interpreted as the
reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. That elasticity Is around four
for the typical manufacturing firm, according to the results. Since
few American firms are simple monopolies, the finding probably
requires a more elaborate Interpretation in terms of theories of
oligopoly and product differentiation. Then the finding lends strong
support to the view that these theories are more realistic than the
simple theory of competition.
Departures from competition in the product market are not the
only potential explanation of the finding of this paper. Monopsony In
input markets Is another possibility. For example, a monopsonist In
the labor market faces a marginal cost of labor in excess of the
wage it pays. In principle, a firm with sufficient monopsony power
In the labor market but facing competitive conditions in Its product
market could have its price equal to its actual marginal cost, but
well above the level inferred from the quoted wage in my
calculations. However, I am not aware of any reason to think that
monopsony In input markets Is anywhere near pervasive enough to
explain these findings. On the other hand, simple monopoly or more
complicated types of monopoly power in labor or other Input markets
have no role In explaining the finding. In the labor market, all that
is needed for my purposes is that the measured wage Is the actual
incremental cost of labor. Broader efficiency issues will rest on
the question of whether the wage correctly values the foregone time
of workers, but the narrow hypothesis that the firm is a price-taker
in input markets Is all that is needed for measuring the price-
38marginal cost ratio.
A significant Issue of interpretation arises In the case of a
firm thatpurchaseslr4uts under contracts. Contracts have received
the most attention in the labor market, thoch they could distort the
measurement of marginal cost in the case of any Input. A contract
that predetermines the actual Incremental price paid by the
purchaser of an input will not distort the calculations I have made,
unless the contract price is not correctly measured In thewage or
input price data. Contracts of this t.pe create no more than a data
problem, and one that is probably not too severe. A conventional
commercial contract that specifies both price and quantity Is not a
likely source of distortion either. Under such a contract the
allocatlonal price is the current market price. Only if the price data
inslve averages over contracts negotiated In the past will the
calculations go astray. Under such contracts, all that is needed Is to
take total quantities of oath Input, under contract or otherwise, and
compute the revenue share by using the current market price. Even
when these calculations fail to use the market price, the bias In the
estimate of fiislikely to be small and negative, for the reasons
discussed In the previous section.
The previous section considered contracts that set input levels
by a mechanism other than equating the marginal benefit of the input
to the quDted price. The analysis shews that contracts of that type
will not distort the estimate of fiaslong as the average share of the
Input Is correctly measured, This gives considerable assurance that
contracts for inputs are not the explanation for the finding of price
far above marginal cost.
39Errors in measuring labor input are probably the most likely
source of bias in the estimates of .ftrelyrandom errors in
measuring hours of work do not generate a bias; the errors must be
correlated with the right-hand variable, the change in capacity
utilization. My data take advantage of all available data to offset
this problem; they rely on employer data in the case of workers paid
by the hour, and hours reported by salaried workers in the Current
Population Survey. Further, the estimates of seem to be the
highest in those industries, such as paper, where most workers are
classified as production workers and are paid by the hour.
Fluctuations in effort per hour of work, occurring under a wage-
smoothing contract, are another potential explanation of part of the
finding that measured productivity growth Is strongly correlated with
output growth. In the absence of direct measures of work effort, it
is difficult to measure the importance of fluctuations in effort. In
my judgment, it is xilIkely that such fluctuations can fully explain
the findings of this paper.
Changes in the utilization of capital services have been offered as
an explanation of proclical productivity growth. If the fluctuations
occur through additional hours of homogeneous labor, Solow's
productivity calculation takes them properly into account, but if the
Incremental labor is paid more, then a slight error occurs. The
error makes productivity growth positively correlated with output
growth, but the correlation Is probably much too small to accot..nt for
the finidings reported here.
Increasing returns to scale could explain some part of the
positive estimate of $,buta specification that permits increasing
40returns did not, to any important extent reverse the findings of
stror1y positive values for ?.
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